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I. INTRODUCTION 
Don Jones represented himself at trial, but he didn’t really 
want to.1  His public defender applications were denied, and he 
didn’t hire a private attorney.2  A divided Minnesota Supreme 
Court determined that Jones forfeited his right to counsel based on 
his “extremely dilatory” conduct in failing to retain counsel, despite 
being given many opportunities to do so.3  The problem with the 
Jones decision is that forfeiture of fundamental constitutional rights 
is usually reserved for more serious misconduct—for example, 
threatening or abusive behavior, or deliberate wrongdoing—not 
the type of conduct at issue in Jones.4 
The goal of this note is to provide lawyers and judges with 
some guidelines to consider in assessing whether a defendant’s 
behavior is bad enough to result in the loss of the fundamental 
constitutional right to counsel.  With that goal in mind, this note 
will first discuss the requirements for a constitutionally valid waiver 
of counsel, define the terms “waiver by conduct” and “forfeiture” 
that the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on in Jones,5 and explore 
United States Supreme Court decisions that have found that a 
defendant can forfeit fundamental constitutional rights based on 
wrongdoing.6  Next, this note will discuss the Minnesota Supreme 
Court’s decision in Jones and analyze whether Jones’s conduct was 
bad enough to result in forfeiture of the right to counsel.7  Finally, 
this note will provide guidelines to help lawyers and judges 
determine when a defendant’s behavior is bad enough to forfeit 
the right to counsel.8 
 
 1. See State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2009) (Jones applied for a 
public defender four or five times but was denied and was unable to retain counsel 
on his own), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 3275 (2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 501. 
 4. Id. at 514 (Meyer, J., and Anderson, Paul, J., dissenting) (citing United 
States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1101–02 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
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II. DEFINITION OF TERMS—WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR WAIVER, 
WAIVER BY CONDUCT, AND FORFEITURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS? 
In holding that Jones forfeited his right to counsel, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court discussed the concepts of waiver, waiver 
by conduct, and forfeiture.9  Because these concepts have not been 
universally adopted,10 it is important to define them. 
A. Waiver 
While a defendant can waive the right to counsel, the trial 
court is responsible for ensuring that the waiver complies with the 
federal constitution and state law. 
1. Constitutional Requirements 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental 
constitutional right.11  The Sixth Amendment “is one of the 
safeguards . . . necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life 
and liberty.”12  Further, the Sixth Amendment “embodies a realistic 
recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does 
not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when 
brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, 
wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned 
counsel.”13 
Although the right to counsel is a fundamental right,14 Faretta 
v. California established that a criminal defendant is also afforded 
the concomitant right to waive counsel and represent himself at 
trial.15  Nonetheless, as with other fundamental rights, the Supreme 
Court consistently guards the defendant’s fundamental right to 
counsel by “indulg[ing] every reasonable presumption against 
 
 9. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 504–06. 
 10. See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 895 n.2 (1991) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part) (noting that courts use the terms waiver and forfeiture 
interchangeably, although the “two are really not the same . . .”); State v. 
Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 548 (Tenn. 2000)(citing United States v. Goldberg, 67 
F.3d 1092, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995)(noting that some courts uses these terms 
interchangeably). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 12. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938). 
 13. Id. at 462–63. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
 15. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). 
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waiver . . . .”16  Further, the Supreme Court “do[es] not presume 
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.”17  Accordingly, a 
waiver is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right or privilege.”18  When a defendant waives a 
fundamental right, the trial judge has the responsibility of ensuring 
that the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.19 
In determining whether the defendant’s waiver of counsel 
meets these requirements, the trial court must, at a minimum, 
ensure that the defendant has enough information to make an 
intelligent choice.20  This includes warnings of the hazards and 
pitfalls of proceeding to trial uncounseled, as well as ensuring that 
the defendant understands the nature of the charges and the range 
of allowable punishments, so that the record establishes that he 
“knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”21  
These warnings will be referred to throughout this article as “Faretta 
warnings.” 
Further, in exercising its duty of ensuring that the defendant’s 
waiver of counsel is competent and intelligent, the trial court 
should make this determination on the record.22  Finally, the 
determination of whether the defendant intelligently waived the 
right to counsel depends “upon the particular facts and 
circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, 
experience, and conduct of the accused.”23 
 
 16. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (“But waiver requires not merely 
comprehension but relinquishment . . . .”). 
 17. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. 
Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id.; see also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400–01 (1993) (discussing 
competency required to waive counsel); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 
(1981) (discussing waiver of counsel as it relates to the voluntariness of a 
confession). 
 20. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; see also Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88–89 (2004) 
(citations omitted) (discussing the difference between the information the 
defendant must possess to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel 
before deciding to represent himself at trial and the information the defendant 
must possess at other earlier stages of the proceedings, such as when entering a 
guilty plea). 
 21. See Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 
317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 22. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465. 
 23. Id. 
4
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2. Minnesota Law 
Consistent with these principles, Minnesota law explicitly 
requires that a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel be in 
writing.24  However, if the defendant refuses to sign the waiver, the 
waiver must be on the record.25  And before the court can accept 
the waiver, the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure require the 
courts to advise defendants of the following: 
(a) nature of the charges; 
(b) all offenses included within the charges; 
(c) range of allowable punishments; 
(d) there may be defenses; 
(e) mitigating circumstances may exist; and 
(f) all other facts essential to a broad understanding of 
the consequences of the waiver of the right to counsel, 
including the advantages and disadvantages of the 
decision to waive counsel.26 
Although Minnesota law explicitly provides that the 
defendant’s waiver of counsel must be in writing or on the record, 
the district court did not have Jones sign a written waiver of 
counsel.  The on-the-record waiver was insufficient because it did 
not include the nature of the charges or the dangers and 
disadvantages of waiving counsel.27 
B. Waiver by Conduct 
Although Jones’s waiver of counsel did not comply with Faretta 
or Minnesota law,28 the Minnesota Supreme Court considered 
whether the waiver was valid under a different theory.29  The 
supreme court relied on the concepts of waiver by conduct and 
 
 24. MINN. STAT. § 611.19 (2010); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.04, subdiv. 1(4).  
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.04 was previously numbered Minnesota 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.02, but it has not substantively changed. 
 25. MINN. STAT. § 611.19. 
 26. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.04, subdiv. 1(4).  These requirements are consistent 
with the minimum requirements necessary to ensure that the waiver of counsel is 
knowing and intelligent, particularly the requirement that the defendant “be 
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the 
record establishes that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes 
open.’” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United 
States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). 
 27. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn. 2009). 
 28. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 611.19; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807. 
 29. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 506. 
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forfeiture as discussed by the Third Circuit in United States v. 
Goldberg.30  According to the Goldberg definitions, waiver by conduct 
is a hybrid situation that combines elements of waiver and 
forfeiture: “[o]nce a defendant has been warned that he will lose 
his attorney if he engages in dilatory tactics, any misconduct 
thereafter may be treated as an implied request to proceed pro se 
and, thus, as a waiver of the right to counsel.”31  However, the 
defendant must also be advised of the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation, as required by Faretta.32  Accordingly, waiver by 
conduct only applies where the defendant is aware of the 
consequences of his actions, including the risks of self-
representation.33 
In jurisdictions that follow the Goldberg definition of waiver by 
conduct,34 courts have found that the defendant waives counsel by 
unreasonable or uncooperative conduct that sabotages the 
relationship with counsel or repeatedly failing to retain counsel 
where the record is clear that the defendant had the demonstrated 
financial ability to retain counsel.35  On the other hand, where the 
 
 30. 67 F.3d 1092, 1099–1102 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 31. Id. at 1100 (citations omitted). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1103 (noting that any claim that Goldberg waived counsel by his 
conduct is precluded by the government’s concession that the district court failed 
to inform him of the risks of self-representation in accordance with Faretta). 
 34. Id. at 1100. 
 35. See, e.g., United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that the defendant can waive the right to counsel by conduct in being 
uncooperative and rejecting appointed counsel where the defendant understands 
that his only alternative is self-representation with its “many attendant dangers”); 
United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 955–56 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the 
defendant waived counsel by conduct where he was warned of the disadvantages of 
self-representation but he deliberately sabotaged his relationship with six different 
appointed attorneys causing a twenty-month delay in scheduling the trial); King v. 
Bobby, 433 F.3d 483, 488, 493–94 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding defendant waived 
counsel by his conduct when he refused to retain an attorney despite his financial 
ability to do so, refused to work with his attorney, and the defendant was aware of 
the disadvantages of self-representation); United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 672 
(7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the defendant impliedly waived counsel by his 
conduct where he had two different court-appointed lawyers; the defendant found 
them unsatisfactory; the court gave him the choice of staying with the court-
appointed lawyer, retaining his own lawyer, or representing himself, and the 
defendant appeared at trial without a lawyer; and the court’s warnings about the 
dangers of self-representation, although perfunctory, were adequate); United 
States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the “combination 
of ability to pay for counsel plus refusal to do so does waive the right to counsel at 
trial” where the defendant was warned about the dangers of self-representation); 
United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 166–67 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding waiver 
6
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record does not indicate that the defendant had the financial ability 
to retain counsel and the court failed to warn the defendant of the 
dangers of self-representation, courts have held that waiver by 
conduct does not apply.36  The Minnesota Supreme Court found 
that waiver by conduct did not apply to Jones’s case because he was 
never warned of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation.37 
C. Forfeiture 
According to the Goldberg definitions, forfeiture does not 
require any advance warnings and “results in the loss of a right 
regardless of the defendant’s knowledge thereof and irrespective of 
whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right.”38  Because 
forfeiture is a severe sanction, the defendant’s misconduct must be 
“extremely dilatory” or “extremely serious.”39  Examples of 
“extremely serious” or “extremely dilatory” misconduct include 
assaulting counsel,40 verbally abusing or threatening counsel, and 
egregious manipulation (for example, making unreasonable 
demands of counsel or unreasonably discharging counsel for the 
 
by conduct based on the defendant’s stubborn failure to retain counsel where he 
had the financial ability to do so, but was refusing to do so unless he found 
counsel who agreed with his views about the invalidity of the tax laws, and he was 
repeatedly warned by the court of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation). 
 36. See, e.g., United States v. Meeks, 987 F.2d 575, 579 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding 
that the defendant did not waive counsel where the defendant’s court-appointed 
counsel was allowed to withdraw, but the court would not allow the defendant to 
substitute counsel, leaving him without representation, and the court did not 
advise him of the dangers of proceeding pro se); Jackson v. James, 839 F.2d 1513, 
1516 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that the defendant did not waive counsel where the 
defendant’s court-appointed counsel withdrew, the defendant was not given an 
opportunity to obtain a different lawyer, and there was no evidence that the 
defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation); State v. Pedockie 
137 P.3d 716, 724–26 (Utah 2006) (refusing to find waiver by conduct where the 
defendant was not advised of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation). 
 37. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 505 (Minn. 2009). 
 38. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100. 
 39. Id. at 1101–02. 
 40. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding 
that defendant forfeited counsel where he punched the attorney in the head and 
scratched and spit on him while he was on the ground); State v. Lehman, 749 
N.W.2d 76, 82 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that the defendant forfeited his 
right to counsel by attacking his public defender in open court, causing a cut lip 
and black eye). 
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purpose of delaying or disrupting the administration of justice).41 
However, some courts have found forfeiture under far less 
serious circumstances, such as when a defendant fails to retain 
counsel, despite having the financial ability to do so.42  Nonetheless, 
the Third Circuit determined that Goldberg’s conduct was not 
sufficiently serious to warrant the extreme sanction of forfeiture, 
despite the fact that he threatened his attorney’s life.43  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that Jones’s conduct in 
failing to retain counsel after being given several opportunities to 
do so was “extremely dilatory” as to constitute forfeiture.44 
United States Supreme Court Decisions on Forfeiture 
Although the United States Courts of Appeals and state courts 
have determined that a defendant can forfeit the right to counsel 
by bad behavior,45 the United States Supreme Court has never 
considered this issue.46  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held 
 
 41. See United States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 363 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding 
that defendant’s verbal abuse and refusal to cooperate with counsel, including his 
attempt to force the attorney to file frivolous claims as he had with his previous 
attorneys, constituted forfeiture of the right to counsel); United States v. McLeod, 
53 F.3d 322, 325–26 (11th Cir. 1995) (concluding that forfeiture occurred where 
the defendant verbally abused and threatened to sue counsel and demanded that 
counsel engage in unethical conduct); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 550 
(Tenn. 2000) (concluding that defendant’s conduct was “sufficiently egregious” to 
constitute forfeiture of counsel where the defendant made unreasonable demands 
of counsel and escalating threats for the purpose of sabotaging his relationship 
with each successive attorney for the purpose of delaying and disrupting his trial). 
 42. See Wilkerson v. Klem, 412 F.3d 449, 451, 455–56 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel; although the 
defendant’s conduct did not rise to the level of “extremely serious misconduct,” 
the defendant advised the court that his family was retaining counsel for him but 
appeared at trial without representation and the public defender acted as standby 
counsel); Commonwealth v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Pa. 2009) 
(concluding that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by failing to retain 
counsel despite having the opportunity and financial ability to do so). 
 43. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1102.  See also State v. Hampton, 92 P.3d 871, 873–75 
(Ariz. 2004) (remanding for the appointment of new counsel despite the fact that 
the defendant had twice made death threats against his court-appointed appellate 
counsel causing both of them to withdraw from representation). 
 44. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 505–06 (Minn. 2009). 
 45. See, e.g., supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
 46. See Wilkerson, 412 F.3d at 454–55 (citation omitted) (analyzing a federal 
habeas petition, the Third Circuit noted that there were no Supreme Court 
decisions involving forfeiture or “providing any clear guidance as to the standard 
to be applied” in determining if a defendant’s misconduct warrants forfeiture of 
the right to counsel); see also Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1100 (“[T]he Supreme Court has 
not ruled directly on this issue . . . .”). 
8
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that a defendant can forfeit other fundamental constitutional 
rights by engaging in wrongdoing that is purposefully directed at 
the constitutional right forfeited.  Although these decisions do not 
involve forfeiture of the right to counsel, they do involve other 
Sixth Amendment rights that, like the right to counsel, are 
“fundamental to the fair administration of American justice.”47  
Therefore, they provide persuasive authority regarding how courts 
should evaluate whether the defendant can be deemed to have 
forfeited counsel by his or her bad behavior. 
Before analyzing these decisions, it is important to remember 
that the Supreme Court “generally disfavor[s] inferred waivers of 
constitutional rights.”48  Nonetheless, the Court has occasionally 
recognized that a criminal defendant may impliedly waive or forfeit 
fundamental constitutional rights by misconduct.49  However, the 
forfeiture of a fundamental constitutional right only applies when 
the defendant’s own deliberate actions result in the constitutional 
violation.50 
As early as 1878, the Supreme Court recognized that when the 
defendant deliberately behaves badly, he cannot claim that his 
constitutional rights have been violated.51  In Reynolds v. United 
States,52 the defendant, who was on trial for bigamy, had procured 
the absence of one of his wives from testifying against him at trial 
by concealing her so that the State was unable to serve her with a 
subpoena.53  Reynolds argued that the use of his wife’s testimony 
from a prior trial violated his rights under the Confrontation 
Clause.54  But the Supreme Court held that “[t]he Constitution 
does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate 
consequences of his own wrongful acts.”55  In other words, the 
defendant could not assert that his constitutional right to confront 
the witness against him was violated when his own wrongdoing 
procured her absence from the trial.56 
 
 47. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975) (discussing the rights basic 
to the adversary system of justice, such as the right to confrontation). 
 48. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 515 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
 49. See id. at 508–10 (holding that there was no error when defendant 
willingly went to trial in prison garb). 
 50. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
 51. Id. at 158. 
 52. 98 U.S. 145. 
 53. Id. at 159–60. 
 54. Id. at 158. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 160. 
9
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Thus, with respect to the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme 
Court has consistently held that the defendant’s wrongdoing in 
procuring a witness’s absence can constitute a forfeiture of the 
fundamental right of confrontation.57  But the Supreme Court 
recently clarified and narrowed this rule in Giles v. California,58 
holding that the defendant’s wrongdoing must be directly related 
to procuring the witness’s absence from trial for the purpose of 
preventing the witness from testifying.59 
In Giles, the defendant was on trial for killing his former 
girlfriend.60  The State sought to admit evidence of the girlfriend’s 
out-of-court statements to a police officer about a prior occasion 
when Giles assaulted her.61  Giles asserted that the admission of the 
out-of-court statements violated his rights under the Confrontation 
Clause.62  And the Supreme Court agreed, holding that the 
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing only applies when the 
defendant specifically kills the victim to prevent the victim from 
testifying against him.63  Because there was no evidence that Giles 
had that specific purpose, the State could not use the victim’s out-
of-court statements at Giles’s murder trial.64  Put another way, every 
murder makes the victim unavailable to testify at trial, so unless the 
killing was done for the specific purpose of procuring the victim’s 
absence from trial, the defendant does not forfeit his constitutional 
right to confrontation by causing the victim’s death. 
In some circumstances the Supreme Court has found a loss of 
fundamental constitutional rights based on the defendant’s bad 
behavior during the trial.65  For example, in Illinois v. Allen,66 the 
 
 57. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006) (holding forfeiture 
rule applies to those who procure the silence of witnesses in order to undermine 
the integrity of the judicial process). 
 58. 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). 
 59. Id. at 2684. 
 60. Id. at 2681. 
 61. Id. at 2681–82. 
 62. Id. at 2682. 
 63. Id. at 2687–88. 
 64. Id. at 2693. 
 65. See, e.g., United States v. Nunez, 877 F.2d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(removing defendant from court after multiple verbal disruptions); Scurr v. 
Moore, 647 F.2d 854, 855 (8th Cir. 1981) (assaulting a jailer during recess and 
making obscene outbursts at trial); Jones v. Poole, No. 04 Civ. 0303 (SHS) (THK), 
2005 LEXIS 46297, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005) (communication of 
dissatisfaction with appointed counsel to judge and jury and an attempt to spit on 
counsel); Russ v. Israel, 531 F. Supp. 490, 492–93 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (pro se 
representation “peppered with vulgar remarks”). 
10
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Court held the following: 
[A] defendant can lose his [Sixth Amendment] right to 
be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the 
judge that he will be removed if he continues his 
disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting 
himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and 
disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried 
on with him in the courtroom.67 
In Allen, the defendant insisted on representing himself, but 
the court appointed an advisory counsel to assist him during the 
trial.68  During jury selection, the defendant argued with the judge 
in an abusive and disrespectful manner; when the court asked the 
appointed counsel to continue with the voir dire, the defendant 
objected, threw papers on the floor, and threatened to kill the 
judge.69  The court warned the defendant that if he continued his 
disrespectful conduct, he would be shackled or removed from the 
trial.70  The defendant persisted, was removed from the courtroom 
for most of the trial, and the advisory counsel conducted his 
defense in his absence.71  The Court held that although the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees the right of confrontation, this right 
cannot “handicap a trial judge in conducting a criminal trial.”72  
Accordingly, a criminal defendant can lose his right to be present 
at trial based on his disruptive and disrespectful behavior towards 
the court.73 
These cases all involve the fundamental Sixth Amendment 
right of confrontation.  And they share a common theme—the 
defendant deliberately engaged in wrongdoing that was directly 
related to the constitutional right lost.  In other words, these cases 
stand for the proposition that a defendant cannot complain about 
the loss of constitutional rights when his or her own wrongdoing is 
responsible for the loss. 
 
 
 66. 397 U.S. 337 (1970). 
 67. Id. at 343. 
 68. Id. at 339. 
 69. Id. at 339–40. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 341. 
 72. Id. at 342. 
 73. Id. at 342–43. 
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III. THE JONES CASE AND DECISION 
The next question is how the Minnesota Supreme Court 
applied the concepts of waiver, waiver by conduct, and forfeiture to 
the facts in Jones. 
A. The Case 
Don Jones was charged with three felony offenses: check 
forgery, offering a forged check, and theft by swindle.74  These 
offenses arose from the allegation that Jones deposited a forged 
payroll check from a closed business account for a towing company 
he and his girlfriend operated.75  The check was signed in Jones’s 
girlfriend’s mother’s name, who denied signing the check.76  Jones 
endorsed the check and used the majority of the proceeds to pay 
for the down payment on a Lincoln Navigator.77  The check was 
returned because the account was closed, and Jones never repaid 
the money.78 
At his initial appearance in court, Jones, unrepresented by 
counsel,79 posted bail and told the court that he was “going to get a 
private attorney.”80  So the court continued the next court hearing 
to give him a chance to do so.81  At the next appearance on May 5, 
2006, Jones was unemployed and had not retained counsel, so he 
applied for a public defender.82  Jones was living with his sister, his 
girlfriend, and their one-year-old daughter.83  Jones’s rent and food 
 
 74. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Minn. 2009), cert. denied sub nom., 
Jones v. Minnesota, 130 S. Ct. 3275 (2010); see MINN. STAT. § 609.52, subdiv. 2(4) 
(2008) (defining theft by swindle); Id. § 609.631, subdivs. 2–3 (2008) (laying out 
the elements of check forgery). 
 75. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 500. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Appellant’s Brief at 9, State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. 2009) (No. 
A07-1168). 
 78. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 500. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id.  Jones applied for a public defender several times.  Id. at 508 (Page, J., 
dissenting).  However, only two applications were in the district court file.  Id.  
Both applications are attached to Justice Page’s dissenting opinion.  See id. at 510–
13.  The State argued that Jones “failed to provide a sufficient record for appellate 
review.”  Id. at 502 n.1 (majority opinion).  But the supreme court disagreed and 
held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones’s public 
defender applications.  Id. at 503. 
 83. Id. at 500. 
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were paid by his sister,84 but he had other debts and expenses—
child support for other children, a car payment, and insurance—
totaling between $1384 and $1484 per month.85  Jones’s girlfriend 
was employed, earning a monthly income of $2080.86  Although the 
application listed the Lincoln Navigator as an asset, the value of the 
car was equal to the debt owed.87  The words “deny—over 
guidelines” were written and circled on the application form.88  The 
court recommended that Jones try to retain counsel from the list of 
reduced-fee attorneys, and Jones indicated that he could probably 
hire an attorney in a month.89  He also acknowledged that he was 
probably denied a public defender because of the Lincoln 
Navigator and he would have to sell it.90 
On June 9, 2006, Jones appeared in court without counsel and 
explained he had applied for the public defender twice but his 
applications were denied and none of the reduced-fee attorneys 
had “worked out for him.”91  Jones waived his right to an attorney 
for this appearance.92  On September 8, 2006, Jones appeared for 
an omnibus hearing.93  Jones was unrepresented by counsel but told 
the court he was “kind of getting a little stable” and he would 
contact one of the reduced-fee attorneys.94 
Jones appeared for trial on January 16, 2007, without counsel.95  
He objected to proceeding without counsel.96  Jones was employed, 
and the court told him that his current income would disqualify 
him from the public defender.97  Jones had a private attorney on a 
different case but stated that he could not afford to have him 
handle both cases;98 he reasserted that his public defender 
applications had been denied and the reduced-fee lawyer option 
 
 84. Id. at 508 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89. Id. at 500 (majority opinion). 
 90. Id. at 500–01.  The Lincoln Navigator, having been purchased with the 
proceeds of the allegedly forged check, was repossessed.  See Appellant’s Brief, 
supra note 77, at 24. 
 91. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 501. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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had also not worked for him.99  The district court continued the 
trial date to February 14, 2007, after confirming with the attorney 
representing Jones on the other case that he was waiting for Jones 
to pay the retainer.100  The district court also “acknowledged that 
Jones has been doing the things he has to do but just not finalizing 
them.”101 
 Jones appeared at trial on February 14 without counsel.102  The 
court assumed that Jones was choosing to represent himself 
because he had not retained anyone by the trial date, but Jones 
argued that was not true because he was wrongly denied a public 
defender based on his girlfriend’s income.103  The court ordered 
Jones to fill out another application for a public defender.104  Jones 
was employed, earning $12 an hour, and his girlfriend was also 
employed.105  The application listed their combined gross monthly 
income as $3784 and expenses as $3592.106  The court collector 
explained that the reason for denying the application was because 
Jones’s income alone, $2280, was greater than 125% of the federal 
poverty guidelines.107 
Although the prosecutor asked the court to make a record 
regarding the waiver of counsel,108 the court did not obtain a 
written waiver of Jones’s right to counsel.109  The court advised 
Jones on the record that he had the right to counsel, that his public 
defender applications had been denied four or five times, and that 
he had not been able to retain counsel.110  But the court did not 
advise Jones of the nature of the charges, the dangers and 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 508 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id. at 501 (majority opinion).  While the federal poverty guidelines may 
create a presumption of eligibility, they cannot be used as the sole basis for cutting 
off eligibility because appointment of counsel is based on the court’s 
determination of the defendant’s financial ability to pay.  State v. Ferris, 540 
N.W.2d 891, 894–95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).  Justice Page, in his dissent, expressed 
concern that the district court did not properly exercise discretion when it denied 
Jones’s public defender applications based on the poverty guidelines.  Jones, 772 
N.W.2d at 508 (Page, J., dissenting). 
 108. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 502. 
 109. Id. at 504. 
 110. Id. at 502. 
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disadvantages of self-representation, and Jones objected to 
proceeding without counsel.111  Jones represented himself at the 
three-day jury trial and did not have standby or advisory counsel to 
assist him.112 
Jones was convicted and sentenced to thirty months in prison 
for the check forgery conviction.113  Jones appealed his conviction 
to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.114  The court of appeals 
affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Jones’s applications for the public defender and that 
Jones waived counsel by his conduct in repeatedly failing to retain 
counsel.115  The Minnesota Supreme Court granted Jones’s petition 
for further review on November 25, 2008.116 
B. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision 
1. No Valid Waiver of Counsel 
In a four-three decision, the supreme court affirmed Jones’s 
convictions.117  First, the supreme court considered whether Jones’s 
waiver of counsel was constitutionally valid.  The supreme court 
noted that there are three ways in which a defendant may 
relinquish the constitutional right to counsel: (1) waiver, (2) waiver 
by conduct, and (3) forfeiture.118  Applying these concepts to 
Jones’s case, the supreme court acknowledged that there was no 
“attempt by the district court to obtain a written waiver of counsel 
from Jones” as required by Minnesota law.119 
The supreme court also found that the on-the-record colloquy 
was insufficient because the district court did not advise Jones of 
the nature of the charges or the advantages and disadvantages of 
 
 111. Id. at 504–05. 
 112. See id. at 507; see also State v. Clark, 722 N.W.2d 460, 466–67 (Minn. 2006) 
(reasoning that there is no state constitutional right to advisory counsel). 
 113. State v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 354. 
 116. State v. Jones, No. A07-1168, 2008 LEXIS 632, at *1 (Minn. Nov. 25, 
2008). 
 117. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 507. 
 118. Id. at 504 (citing State v. Pedockie, 137 P.3d 716, 721 (Utah 2006)); see 
United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099–1102 (3d Cir. 1995) (defining the 
concepts of waiver, waiver by conduct, and forfeiture). 
 119. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 504; see also MINN. STAT. § 611.19 (2008) (requiring 
defendant waiving counsel to do so in writing); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.04, subdiv. 1(4) 
(requiring written or on-the-record waiver of the right to counsel). 
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Jones’s decision to waive counsel.120  The court also noted that 
“[m]ore importantly, Jones objected twice to proceeding without 
counsel.”121  Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that, on this 
record, the waiver of counsel was not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary.122 
2. No Waiver by Conduct 
Waiver by conduct requires the same colloquy regarding the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation as required for an 
affirmative waiver of counsel.123  Further, waiver by conduct only 
“applies to those defendants who voluntarily engage[d] in 
misconduct knowing what they stand to lose.”124  Applying these 
principles, the supreme court had no choice but to hold that Jones 
did not waive counsel by his conduct because the district court 
failed to conduct a sufficient, on-the-record colloquy.125 
3. Jones Forfeited Counsel by His Dilatory Conduct 
Under Goldberg, forfeiture requires “extremely serious” or 
“extremely dilatory” misconduct.126  The supreme court determined 
that Jones forfeited his right to counsel because he “engaged in 
conduct that was extremely dilatory” by refusing to retain counsel 
after being given the opportunity to do so on “eight separate 
occasions.”127  In making this determination, the supreme court was 
persuaded by the following facts: the district court repeatedly 
advised Jones to retain counsel, he applied for and was denied the 
public defender at least three times, he told the court that he was 
planning on retaining private counsel, he was granted three 
continuances for the purpose of giving him time to do so, the court 
delayed the trial date to give him a chance to retain counsel, and 
the court warned him he would get no more continuances.128 
 
 120. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 504. 
 121. Id. at 504–05. 
 122. Id. at 505. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Goldberg, 
67 F.3d 1092, 1101 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
 125. Id. (citations omitted). 
 126. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1101–02. 
 127. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 506. 
 128. Id. 
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4. The Dissent 
But in a separate dissent, Justice Meyer, who was joined by 
Justice Paul Anderson, disagreed that Jones’s conduct was 
“extremely dilatory” so as to constitute forfeiture.  First, Justice 
Meyer noted that forfeiture usually only applies in “extreme 
circumstances,” such as when the defendant verbally or physically 
abuses counsel.129  Second, Justice Meyer acknowledged that 
forfeiture might apply in circumstances where a “defendant’s 
purposeful manipulation of the judicial system blocks a court’s 
ability to ensure a sufficient waiver.”130  But where the defendant 
does not “purposefully abuse the privilege, and the court could 
assess the defendant’s awareness of the risks of self-representation, 
forfeiture should not be applied.”131 
Justice Meyer also recognized that “[a] very small number of 
courts have found misconduct ‘extremely dilatory’ when a 
defendant’s actions in obtaining, working with, or changing 
representation have led to excessive delay or inconvenience.”132  But 
there was no doubt in these cases that the defendants were 
purposefully trying to manipulate or delay the proceedings, 
because the defendants were being uncooperative and 
unreasonable.133 
Jones’s case, on the other hand, “does not show such 
purposeful manipulation as to be labeled ‘extremely dilatory 
misconduct.’ Jones’s financial situation made it unclear whether he 
 
 129. Id. at 513–14 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Leggett, 162 
F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325–26 (11th 
Cir. 1995); State v. Lehman, 749 N.W.2d 76, 81–82 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008)). 
 130. Id. at 514 (citing Commonwealth v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Pa. 
2009)) (holding that where the unrepresented defendant refuses to engage in the 
colloquy process, the defendant cannot be allowed to “clog the machinery of 
justice or hamper and delay the state’s efforts to effectively administer justice”). 
 131. Id. (citing State v. Hampton, 92 P.3d 871, 874–75 (Ariz. 2004) (declining 
to find forfeiture, even though the defendant threatened his attorney’s life)). 
 132. Id. at 514–15 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248, 257–58 (5th 
Cir. 1985); State v. Cummings, 546 N.W.2d 406, 418–20 (Wis. 1996)).  In Mitchell, 
the issue on appeal involved the court’s denial of Mitchell’s counsel’s request for a 
continuance, but the court analyzed it under waiver of counsel because the denial 
of the continuance meant that Mitchell represented himself at trial.  Mitchell, 777 
F.2d at 258.  The court held that the defendant cannot deliberately manipulate his 
choice of counsel for the purpose of delaying the trial where the defendant knows 
of the trial date and deliberately retains counsel knowing counsel has a conflict 
with that date.  Id. at 257–58. 
 133. See Mitchell, 777 F.2d at 257–58; Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 514–15; Cummings, 
546 N.W.2d at 418–20. 
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would qualify for a public defender, and his applications for such 
representation were denied with no clear explanation as to why he 
did not qualify.”134  Finally, Justice Meyer recognized that the 
district court never made any findings that Jones’s conduct was 
“done in bad faith or to purposefully delay the proceedings.”135  In 
fact, the contrary is true because the district court “acknowledged 
that Jones was doing what needed to be done, but simply failed to 
‘finalize’ things.”136  For these reasons, the dissent concluded that 
Jones did not forfeit counsel.137 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE JONES DECISION AND GUIDELINES FOR FUTURE 
CASES 
A. Analysis 
Clearly, Jones did not waive counsel under Faretta or 
Minnesota law.  Nor did he waive counsel by his conduct because 
he was never advised of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation.  Left with no other option, the court appears to 
have relied on forfeiture to get around the inadequate on-the-
record colloquy.  But the problem with applying the extreme 
sanction of forfeiture to the Jones facts is that, as the dissent 
recognized, Jones did not engage in any purposeful wrongdoing.138 
He did not abuse or threaten counsel.139  He did not make 
unreasonable demands of counsel in order to sabotage the 
attorney-client relationship for purposes of delay.140  In fact, he was 
never represented by counsel.141  And his conduct in failing to 
retain counsel, where the record is not clear that he actually had 
 
 134. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 515; see also id. at 508 (Page, J., dissenting) (“Because 
the court below failed to make any findings or explain its reasons for denying the 
application on the record in any meaningful way, it is impossible to apply an abuse 
of discretion standard of review to the court’s denials of these applications.”). 
 135. Id. at 515 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 1998); United 
States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325–26 (11th Cir. 1995); State v. Lehman, 749 
N.W.2d 76, 81–82 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
 140. Cf. State v. Cummings, 546 N.W.2d 406, 418–20 (Wis. 1996) (finding 
forfeiture where the defendant consistently refused to cooperate and was 
unreasonably dissatisfied with each of his three court-appointed attorneys so that 
they were allowed to withdraw, leaving him to represent himself). 
 141. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 501. 
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the financial ability to do so, cannot be construed as a deliberate 
attempt to manipulate the proceedings and delay the trial.142  In 
fact, the district court actually “acknowledged that Jones was doing 
what needed to be done . . . .”143  On this record, Jones’s conduct in 
failing to retain counsel cannot be construed as forfeiture.144 
United States Supreme Court precedent does not support the 
result reached by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Jones.  The 
forfeiture cases decided by the Supreme Court have all involved 
purposeful wrongdoing or misconduct that is directly responsible 
for the loss of the constitutional right.145  These decisions are also 
consistent with the general principle that the defendant cannot 
complain about the loss of constitutional rights when his or her 
own deliberate actions are responsible for the loss.146  But these 
principles do not apply to the facts of Jones’s case where the record 
is not clear that Jones deliberately refused to hire counsel to delay 
or manipulate the proceedings, or if he was simply financially 
unable to retain counsel. 
B. Guidelines 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Jones adopted a framework 
for analyzing when a defendant’s behavior is bad enough to forfeit 
constitutional rights.  Although the framework doesn’t really fit the 
facts of Jones’s case, that doesn’t mean it is unworkable.  The 
concepts of waiver, waiver by conduct, and forfeiture can be 
applied, provided the court follows these guidelines: 
• A defendant’s waiver of counsel must be explicit and in 
writing.147 
 
 142. Cf. United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining 
that the defendant’s inability to retain counsel at public expense was a 
consequence of his decision to be vague and withhold access to his financial 
records); Commonwealth v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Pa. 2009) (explaining 
that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by failing to retain counsel, 
despite having the opportunity and financial ability to do so). 
 143. Jones, 772 N.W.2d at 515. 
 144. Cf. Gladden v. State, 110 P.3d 1006, 1008–10 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) 
(reversing defendant’s conviction and concluding that the defendant’s conduct in 
stubbornly refusing to accept appointed counsel and failing to take the steps 
necessary to hire private counsel were not so egregious to constitute forfeiture, 
nor could the defendant’s conduct be considered waiver by conduct because the 
defendant was not warned of the risks of self-representation). 
 145. See, e.g., Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2687–88 (2008). 
 146. See id.; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879). 
 147. MINN. STAT. § 611.19 (2008); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.04, subdiv. 1(4). 
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• If the waiver of counsel is not in writing, the waiver must be 
on the record, include an advisory that complies with 
Minnesota law, and include the nature of the charges, the 
possible penalties, and the dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation.148 
• If the defendant does not waive counsel in writing or on the 
record, but is engaging in manipulative behavior that is 
making it difficult for the court to proceed with the trial, 
then the court must warn the defendant that the continued 
behavior will result in the loss of the constitutional right to 
counsel, and the court must warn the defendant of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.149 
• If the defendant persists in the manipulative conduct and 
the defendant has been warned that (1) the continued 
behavior will result in self-representation and (2) of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, then the 
defendant has waived counsel by conduct.150 
• If the defendant assaults, abuses, or verbally threatens 
counsel, no warning is required; the defendant has forfeited 
the right to counsel.151 
• If the defendant engages in egregious manipulative 
behavior, such as unreasonably discharging appointed or 
retained counsel, making unreasonable demands of counsel 
that subvert the attorney-client relationship and that cause 
counsel to withdraw, or repeatedly refusing to hire counsel 
despite a clearly demonstrated financial ability to do so, this 
conduct may, in a given case, be sufficiently serious to 
warrant the sanction of forfeiture.152  However, the better 
practice is still to conduct a colloquy on the record, warning 
the defendant that the behavior will result in self-
representation and of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation.153 
 
 148. MINN. STAT. § 611.19; MINN. R. CRIM. P. 5.04, subdiv. 1(4); see also Faretta 
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (discussing the information the defendant 
must possess to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel). 
 149. See United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992); 
Commonwealth v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Pa. 2009). 
 150. See State v. Cummings, 546 N.W.2d 406, 418–20 (Wis. 1996). 
 151. See United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 1998); United 
States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325–26 (11th Cir. 1995); State v. Lehman, 749 
N.W.2d 76, 81–82 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
 152. United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099–1101 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 153. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Although jurisdictions disagree on how badly the defendant 
must behave before he or she can be deemed to have forfeited the 
right to counsel, under the Goldberg rubric adopted by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, Jones’s conduct was not bad enough.154  
Certainly a defendant who mistreats his or her lawyer by abusive or 
threatening conduct forfeits the right to counsel.155  It is also 
apparent that a defendant who deliberately sabotages his or her 
relationship with counsel, causing counsel to withdraw, or who has 
the financial ability to retain counsel but fails to do so to 
purposefully delay the trial can be deemed to have forfeited the 
right to counsel.156  These circumstances are consistent with the 
principle that a defendant cannot argue that his constitutional 
rights are violated when his own conduct leads to the violation.157  
But Jones was never represented by counsel,158 so he did not forfeit 
the right to counsel based on wrongful conduct towards counsel.  
And Jones’s conduct in failing to retain counsel cannot be 
construed as an attempt to manipulate or delay the trial because it 
is not clear that Jones actually had the financial ability to retain 
counsel.159  Therefore, Jones conduct cannot be considered 
forfeiture under any definition. 
 
 
 154. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 1099–01. 
 155. See Leggett, 162 F.3d at 250; McLeod, 53 F.3d at 325–26; Lehman, 749 
N.W.2d at 81–82. 
 156. See United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1992); Commonwealth v. 
Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Pa. 2009). 
 157. Bauer, 956 F.2d at 695. 
 158. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Minn. 2009). 
 159. Id. at 509 (Page, J., dissenting). 
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